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Abstract
This paper focuses on TFP analysis in the context of the impressive reforms of the ease
of doing business in Vietnam using a novel and unique micro dataset of manufacturing
enterprises between 2000 and 2010. The first phase of the reforms (2000-2005) observed
the implementation of business start-up simplification, and the central governance of
business regulations was decentralized to provincial authorities in the second phase
(2006-2010). Results of this research are as follows. First, on average, larger firm-
size and higher TFP growth rate were mostly observed in manufacturers at the TFP
frontier (the fourth quartile of TFP). Second, the average ratio of female workers was
higher in leading TFP manufacturers than in less productive firms in low-technology
industries, especially in the second phase of the reforms. Third, the TFP catch-
up of the least productive firms to the frontier firms was faster in the second phase
(2006-2010) compared to the first phase (2000-2005) across all industries and economic
regions. However, larger TFP gaps still existed in high-technology industries. Last
but not least, the first-difference estimation of panel data comprising 63 provinces (in
the second phase of the reforms) shows that local governments that performed better
in the ease of doing business significantly fostered provincial manufacturing TFP in
either for upper or lower productive provinces in Vietnam. Furthermore, a province
gained significant spillovers from nearby elite provinces with leading productivity.
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1 Introduction
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) has been regarded as a key driver of economic growth
(Comin (2010)). TFP explains the growth of output that does not derive from the number
of inputs used, but from the levels of technology efficiency (innovation), management and
quality of inputs exploited in production (Syverson (2011), and Van Beveren (2012)).
Therefore, governments, especially in developing countries, have made great efforts in
implementing economic reforms to stimulate productivity.
With the availability of TFP estimation methods and micro-data, important results
are revealed in TFP dispersion and TFP determinations in developing countries such as
China and India (Syverson, 2011). TFP gaps may indicate implications for TFP catch-up
of least productive firms to frontier firms.1 Attention is also paid to a nexus between
the performance of manufacturing in terms of TFP and crucial econonomic topics such as
agglomeration effects, FDI spillovers, economic reforms (e.g: trade liberalization, business
regulations for the ease of doing business, and the roles of institutions), etc.2 Notably,
Isaksson (2007) indicates institutions as one of the drivers of TFP growth since the for-
mation of capital and the enhancement of resource allocation are only effective under
the control of good institutions. Dixit (2009, p.1) clearly defines economic governance
as “structure and functioning of the legal and social institutions that support economic
activity and economic transactions by protecting property rights, enforcing contracts, and
taking collective action to provide physical and organizational infrastructure”. Earlier,
in a study by North (1994), it is stated that institutional regulations could stimulate the
productivity as they reduce transaction costs for enterprises. Later, Djankov et al. (2006)
refer to the growth in per capita income thanks to improved economic governance that
induces a reduction in business costs.
Vietnam is an emerging economy that has made impressive economic reforms since the
Doimoi (Renovation) in 1986 (Leung, 2015). The economy has restructured from agricul-
ture to manufacturing industries (McCaig and Pavcnik (2013)), and light industries have
been at the forefront (Mishra et al., 2014). Remarkably, the new Law on Enterprises came
into effect in 2000 to cut the “red tape”. Since then, the administration procedures for
start-up businesses was simplified. As remarked by UNIDO (2011a), the reform of busi-
ness registration benefits both state and private enterprises since it fosters more creation
1Interestingly, much interest has been paid to factors such as: competition (Syverson, 2004), sunk cost
(Collard-Wexler, 2011), industry’s resource reallocation and de-licensing (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009), and
characteristics of inputs including human measure (schooling and gender) (Fox and Smeets, 2011) that
might narrow the TFP difference between the leading firms (firms at 90th, or 75th quantiles of TFP) and
the firms left behind (firms at 10th or 25th quantiles of TFP).
2For example: estimation of agglomeration effects (Combes et al. (2012), or learning by exporting (De
Loecker (2007), De Loecker (2013)), spillover effects from FDI (Halpern and Murakozy (2007), Abraham
et al. (2010), Newman et al. (2015), and Anwar and Nguyen (2014)), industry switching (Newman et al.,
2012), job reallocation (De Loecker and Konings, 2006). Scholars are interested in the investigation of
TFP in the context of economic reforms (e.g: impacts of international trade liberalization (Topalova and
Khandelwal (2010), Francois and Hoekman (2010)), and more specifically in economic governance reforms
(Acemoglu et al. (2005), Acemoglu and Robinson (2008), Djankov et al. (2006), Malesky and Taussig
(2009), McCulloch and Malesky (2011), Alder et al. (2012), and Ghosh (2013))
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and development of enterprises, and an extension of business community. Importantly, in
2006, the government took a further step to set up local “one-stop shops” to decentral-
ize the control on business registration and foreign investment licenses of enterprises from
the central authorities (in municipalities) to the local authorities of 63 provinces. 3 These
steps of reforms enhanced the transparency and effectiveness of administrative regulations
for business in Vietnam. They are followed by the official participation of Vietnam into
the World Trade Organization in early 2007.
In the scope of this study, the ease of doing business reforms are referred to as the
reforms of business registration, and the quality improvement of provincial governance in
creating better business environment. Hence, the reforms in the country during 2000-2010
can be divided into two phases. The early phase was from 2000-2005, and the second
phase happened during 2006-2010.
After 11 years of the reforms, Vietnam moved out of the least developing country list,
and became a lower middle-income developing country in 2011. The evidence of rapid
growth in manufacturing labour productivity during the structural reforms in Vietnam
(1990-2008) is reviewed in detail by McCaig and Pavcnik (2013). Additionally, various pa-
pers have recently estimated the industry-level and firm-level TFP.4 However, few studies
show evidence of inclusive development in Vietnam, such as whether more female employ-
ees worked for high productivity enterprises? Recent research has not investigated the
difference in TFP between urbanized areas (municipal) and less developed areas (non-
municipal) in Vietnam. Moreover, the TFP catch-up of least productive firms to frontier
productivity firms within each manufacturing industries and across economic regions in
Vietnam has not yet reported. Current literature also pays no due attention to whether
the gaps in TFP were narrowed after the economic reforms in the country.
The decentralization of central regulations on enterprise business has paved a new way
for provincial authorities to practice the application of policy reforms locally. According
to Dixit (2009), the practice of law is more important for the economic growth than the
issuance of the law itself. Hence, analysing Vietnamese manufacturing TFP in the light of
local economic governance support for the ease of doing business during 2000-2010 might
provide interesting results. Has Vietnam learnt from the two economic legends in Asia,
Hong Kong and Singapore, where the performance of the governments gained “top mark”
from private enterprises (Weder and Brunetti, 2000)? Whether the better performance of
decentralized authorities plays any roles in local manufacturing productivity in Vietnam?
Few research investigates the impacts of provincial governance enhancement on technical
3According to Dixit (2015), “one-stop shops” is more efficient even when the corruption is unavoid-
able.
4For example: Nguyen et al. (2008) were pioneers in using the Vietnamese Enterprise Survey to in-
vestigate the FDI spillovers in services in Vietnam with the TFP estimated by OLS method. Later,
Thangavelu (2010) applied semi-parametrics methods to estimate TFP of foreign firms, and evaluate TFP
in the context of the financial constraints; Newman et al. (2012) used the index method to calculate TFP
and investigate the switching behaviour of manufacturing firms in Vietnam. Ha and Kiyota (2014) also
measured the TFP index linked with trade liberalization in Vietnam. Anwar and Nguyen (2014) used OLS
to estimate TFP of manufacturing firms for eight economic regions in Vietnam with the implications for
region development policies.
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efficiency of local manufacturing in Vietnam and in other developing countries.
This paper thus aims to investigate the pattern of TFP in manufacturing industries in
Vietnam (including TFP gaps) across industries, and key economic regions in the context
of economic reforms between 2000 and 2010 (in two sub-periods: 2000-2005 and 2006-
2010). It also analyses the impacts of better local governance on innovation and technical
efficiency on 63 provinces in the country. The contributions of this research to the literature
are as follows:
First, a unique up-to-date unbalanced panel dataset is compiled for 2-digit manufactur-
ing industries drawn from the Vietnamese Enterprise Survey (2000-2010).5 The survey is
conducted by the Vietnamese General Statistics Office (GSO) annually. This complete and
unique dataset provides additional rich information for more precise analysis in the case
of Vietnamese manufacturing for an eleven year period. To analyse the improvement in
the provincial economic governance, the micro dataset is merged with a provincial dataset
(provided online by GSO at www.gso.gov.vn), and with the provincial competitiveness
index (measured by the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry). Previous study
that analysed firm-level data with the PCI was conducted by Malesky (2010)). However,
because PCI is an index which reflects the assessment of provincial government quality in
general, it is more appropriate to combine it with a provincial aggregated dataset for the
analysis.
Second, the TFP is measured from the modification of the IVs estimator (Wooldridge
(2009) and Petrin and Levinsohn (2012)) in which time effects are applied to control for
business cycles to shape the production function more precisely. More importantly, this
approach could exclude the measurement errors of value added and unpredicted TFP
shocks. TFP is estimated for each phases of the economic reforms.
Third, for the first time, quantitative analysis is presented for average firm sizes, fe-
male to male employment ratio, capital intensity, and TFP growth rate across ln(TFP )
quartiles. Moreover, TFP differences in each industry across key economic regions are
also investigated for the two sub-periods. Interesting results show that higher numbers
of female workers entered into the labour force of the leading productive firms, but in
low-technology intensity industries, especially in the second phase of reforms. The fact
that the TFP gaps were narrowed in the second phase implies the faster catch-up of least
productive firms to frontier firms after the early phase of the reforms.
Last but not least, this paper examines the crucial role that provincial economic gov-
ernance (for the ease of doing business) plays in fostering local manufacturing TFP, in
conjunction with other TFP key drivers such as FDI spillovers, labour density, absorp-
tive capacity, and industrialization. The first differencing panel model for 63 provinces in
Vietnam is applied for the investigation. Empirical results show the positive impacts of
better provincial authorities on local productivity for both upper and lower productivity
provinces.
5When estimating industry production function, we combined several industries together, and drop
three industries due to the small number of observations. The number of industries is then collapsed to
seventeen. See more details in the Data Appendix
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This paper is arranged as follows: the first part gives an overview of the development
of industries in the context of relevant government policies. The second part contains a
literature review. The third part presents the theoretical framework of the IV estima-
tor for industry specific production parameters and the TFP measurement at firm-level.
The fourth part describes the dataset and exhibits selected stylized facts. The fifth part
presents and discusses the results. The last part draws implications for further studies
and conclusions.
2 Overview of the Ease of Doing Business Reforms in Viet-
nam
The existing literature widely discusses the economic reforms in Vietnam (for example,
see Leung (2015), and McCaig and Pavcnik (2013)). More details about the reform of
business registration in Vietnam for the period between 2003 and 2011 could be found
in a report by UNIDO (2011a). This section briefly sketches out an overview of the
reforms of the ease of doing business that is relevant to the manufacturing industries in
Vietnam.6 For the 2000-2010 period, this study divides the business reforms in Vietnam
into 2 phases: (i) in the first phase of the reforms (2000-2005), the Vietnamese government
has implemented series of policies to simplify the registration of new firms (“red tape cut”);
(ii) in the second phase (2006-2010), the country created local “one-stop shop” which have
decentralized economic governance to the provincial level since 2006 in order to ease the
doing of business. Besides that, there have been intensive efforts to support infrastructure
for industries since the Doimoi(Renovation) in 1986.
The most impressive policies with relevance to the manufacturing industries were the
introduction of the first Law on Enterprises in 1999, and the introduction of its amendment
in 2005. The 1999 Law on Enterprises cut a major number of administrative procedures
for the establishment of new firms. The 2005 Law on Enterprises is seen as the unifi-
cation of the 1999 Law on Enterprises and the 2003 Law on State Owned Enterprises.
Furthermore, the new Law on Investment in 2005 introduced more types of foreign in-
vestment to Vietnam, and allowed foreign investors to apply to provincial authorities for
investment licenses (except for some conditional or prohibited industries). As a result, the
cumbersome requirement documents for new firm registration, and the contradictory in
regulations for Private enterprises, State-owned enterprises and Foreign-owned enterprises
have been impressively cut. UNIDO (2011b) reported that average time for formal busi-
ness establishment in the periods between 1991-1999, 2000-2005, 2009-2011 respectively
was 6-12 months, 50 days, and 5 days. Figure 3 exhibits an increase in the number of
manufacturers by provinces in Vietnam for the year 2000, 2005 and 2010. In 2000, big
clusters of manufacturers were seen in Hanoi, Hochiminh city and their satellites cities
while North West, North Central Coast, and Central Highland regions saw very small
number of firms. The map of year 2005 shows that number of manufacturers spread out
6See a complete review of the economic reforms in Vietnam documented by McCaig and Pavcnik (2013).
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in other areas rather than the two biggest cities and their satellites (See Figure 3). Espe-
cially, after 5 years implementing the decentralization, the rising number of manufacturing
producers is observed more clearly in the map of year 2010 (See Figure 3).
Figure 1: Number of Firms by Province, 2000, 2005 & 2010
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Source: Firm-level data was drawn from the Vietnam Enterprise Survey (Vietnam General Statistic Office, 2000, 2005, and 2010).
Administrative boundaries are based on Global Administrative Areas data (www.gadm.org). Several Vietnamese islands (e.g. Hoang
Sa and Truong Sa) are not displayed due to the limitation of the GADM administrative boundaries data.
In addition, important support is given to the manufacturing industries in Vietnam
by the National Master Plan and relevant policies for the establishment and management
of Industrial Zones (IZs), Export Processing Zones (EPs), and High-tech Zones (HZs).
Francois and Davies (2015) note that EPZs are popularly implemented as an important
industrial policy mix in low per capita income countries for FDI attraction and export
stimulation. In Vietnam, better infrastructure and reasonable land rents are offered to
the firms established inside these zones. Income tax reduction is also applied for employees
working in the zones. In 2008, the government set up local control for enterprises that
operate in the zones. From 1991 to 2011, there were nearly 300 IZs, EPZs, and HZs
established in Vietnam (Ministry of Investment and Planning, 2011).
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3 Literature Review
3.1 Production Function Estimation
Much literature has surveyed the TFP measurement methods, such as studies of Van
Biesebroeck (2004), Ackerberg et al. (2007), and Van Beveren (2012). These surveys indi-
cate the advantages of semi-parametric (by Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003)), and instrumental variables estimation, system of linear equations by Wooldridge
(2009)) over ordinary least squares, fixed effects, and instrumental variables (with external
instruments). The main findings show that the novelty of semi-parametric method and
its extensions could solve the endogeneity between inputs and unobserved productivity.
The robustness to measurement errors is also noted for semi-parametric method (Van
Biesebroeck (2004)).
To solve the bias issue of ordinary least square estimation for production function,
Olley and Pakes (1996) first decomposed production function residuals into the firm’s
productivity and the random and zero-mean measurement errors, then used the inverse
function of investment as the proxy for the unobserved productivity. Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003) proposed to exploit intermediate inputs as the alternative proxy in case of lumpy
investment. As claimed by Ackerberg et al. (2006), multicollinearity could happens when
labour is correlated with the proxy, then the labour coefficient cannot be identified. To
overcome this issue, Wooldridge (2009) and later Petrin and Levinsohn (2012) suggested
applying IVs estimator using the own lags of labour for its instruments.
De Loecker (2013) and De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) developed the framework
of Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) by incorporating the export
status of firms (or the export volume of each firm) into the non-parametric function of
inputs for unobserved productivity. De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) considered both
the Cobb-Douglas and the translog production function in their paper, and they estimate
mark-up for firms in an imperfect competition market. De Loecker and Warzynski (2012)
found that exporting firms obtained higher productivity with gained markup. As being
noted by De Loecker and Warzynski (2012), the Chilean data used in the study has
rich information in trade while the Vietnamese enterprise survey does not include yearly
information of firm-level export activity.
In addition, the Difference and System Generalized Method of Moments was introduced
by Blundell and Bond (2000). This method is applied especially for the case of dynamic
models with persistent data and serial correlation in the error terms. The method sheds a
light on the estimation of dynamic model for production function when (i) serial correlation
exists in productivity shocks (the shocks are assumed to be i.i.d across observations.,
(ii) demands of inputs are influenced by these shocks, (iii) external instruments are not
available, (iv) the model has heteroskedaticity, (v) there is a panel with large number of
observations and a short time series (Bond (2002)).
The model of Blundell and Bond (2000) was further commented on for practice by
Bond (2002) in the case of the autoregressive model for investment rate and production
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function estimation. The Blundell and Bond (2000) method was then applied by Van
Beveren (2012) for the case of a single product in the manufacture of food and beverages
in Belgium. 7
Importantly, it is noted that while methods of Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003) and Wooldridge (2009) are relevant to each other because they ap-
plied semi-parametric (i.e: using unknown function of capital stocks and intermediate
inputs/investment as the proxy for the unobserved productivity), the method proposed
by Blundell and Bond (2000) does not use semi-parametric, but a dynamic model to
manage the persistent data. Ackerberg et al. (2006) attempted to link the two trends of
methodologies in production function estimation to correct for the multicollinearity issue
between labour inputs and the non-parametric terms in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and
Olley and Pakes (1996). Ackerberg et al. (2006) reset the timing of firms’ inputs choice in
seeking the assumption of non-collinearity between labour inputs and other inputs. The
method proposed byAckerberg et al. (2006) has two-steps in which coefficients of labour
inputs and capital are estimated in the second step.
3.2 Total Factor Productivity (TFP) Measurement and Application
Thanks to the increasing availability of micro-data and a wide range of methods for pro-
duction function estimation, various studies are applied to measure TFP at firm-level in
the light of interesting economic topics. First, the common steps in TFP measurement are:
(i) to apply the most appropriate method to estimate the production function parameters
in a specific industry;8 and (ii) to use parameters estimated to measure TFP. Second,
the TFP measured will be considered to be either directly the object for dispersion and
tendency analysis, 9 or the dependent variable in estimating the impacts of trade policy
reforms 10, or the impacts of trade liberalization on jobs and productivity growth, 11 ag-
7Roodman (2009a) proposes an user written command xtabond2 that can apply the system GMM for
micro-data using Stata. The paper of Roodman (2009a) also provides a complete guideline for the applica-
tion with appropriate tests in difference contexts. For instant, Roodman (2009b) suggested that in case of
test for overidentification, the Hansen-J test is for homogeneity, Sargan test is for heteroskedaticity; test for
auto-correlations with different levels of lags, and flexible options, such as: robustness to heterokedasticity,
choice of different lag levels, etc. The discussion for system GMM application when there are too many
instruments is in the paper of Roodman (2009b).
8Van Biesebroeck (2004) surveyed methods of production function estimation (Index, semi-parametric
(Olley and Pakes (1996)), system GMM (Blundell and Bond (2000)), etc) and conducted estimations which
applied these methods on simulated dataset. The author concluded that semi-parametric method is least
sensitive to the measurement errors in dataset while index method require the highest accuracy of input
data.
9see Syverson (2011) for the survey of literature in determinants of TFP; Syverson (2004) for the case
study of the US, and Hsieh and Klenow (2009) for the case studies of India and China
10see Francois and Hoekman (2010) for the complete review of literature on trade in services, see Amiti
and Konings (2007), and Topalova and Khandelwal (2010) for case studies of India and Indonesia respec-
tively)
11see Francois et al. (2011)
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glomeration effects, 12 and FDI spillovers. 13 Additionally, Isaksson (2007, abstract) lists
determinants of TFP as follows: “education, health, infrastructure, imports, institutions,
openness, competition, financial development, geographical predicament, and absorptive
capacity”.
Several empirical studies are listed in table 1.
Table 1: Summary of selected empirical research
Year Author(s) Topic TFP Estimation Dataset Time frame Sample
2015 Newman et al FDI spillovers Instrumental Variables, JW Vietnam 2009-2012 more than 30 workers, Manufacturing
2014 Ha & Kyota Trade liberalization TFP Index Vietnam 2000-2009 more than 20 workers, Manufacturing
2014 Anwar & Nguyen FDI spillover by regions OLS Vietnam 2000-2005 Manufacturing
2013 Tran & Pham FDI spatial spillover LP, Stochastic Frontier Vietnam 2001-2005 Manufacturing
2008 Nguyen et al FDI spillovers OLS Vietnam 2000-2005 Services
2015 Arnold et al Liberalization in Services effects Semi-parametrics (OP, DL) India 1993-2005 Manufacturing
2012 Combes et al Productivity advantages of Large cities OLS, LP France 1994-2002
2012 De Loecker & Warzynski Markup & Export Status extended LP & OP Slovenia 1994-2000 Manufacturing
2012 Levinsohn & Petrin Aggregate TFP growth Instrumental Variables Chile 1979-1986 Manufacturing
2012 Van Beveren Review of TFP OLS/OP/LP/System GMM Belgium 1996-2005 Food & Beverages
2011 Collard-Wexler Productivity dispersion and Plant Selection OLS & Control function the US 1963-1997 Manufacturing
2010 Topalova & Khandelwal Trade liberalization LP India 1987-2001 Manufacturing
2009 Hsieh & Klenow Misallocation Index China & India Manufacturing
2009 Arnord & Javorcik FDI ownership effects TFP Index Indonesia 1983-1996 Manufacturing
2007 Amitti & Konings Trade liberalization OP Indonesia 1991-2001 Manufacturing
2006 De Loecker & Konings Job Reallocation & Aggregate Growth OP Slovenia 1994-2000 Manufacturing
2004 Syveson Productivity Dispersion Index the US 1977 Manufacturing
Regarding the studies on TFP difference, Syverson (2011) summarized research on
patterns of TFP in light of competition (Syverson, 2004), sunk cost (Collard-Wexler,
2011), and input quality (Fox and Smeets, 2011), etc. Syverson (2011) also indicated the
determinants of firm-level TFP such as: managerial experience/talent, quality of inputs,
information technology and R&D, learning-by-doing, production innovation, firm’s relative
size, firm’s vertical and horizontal linkage, etc.
TFP dispersion is explained differently in the literature. Fox and Smeets (2011) showed
that for eight Danish industries, both human capital measures (schooling and gender) and
wage bill equally influence the ratio of 90th and 10th productivity percentiles. However,
Collard-Wexler (2011) was in favour of sunk cost for the explanation of TFP difference
while Syverson (2004) considered competition the key driver of the TFP gap. Industry
de-licensing and size restriction policies were taken into account for the TFP difference
analysis in India (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). However, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) found
no significant evidence of a link between TFP dispersion and de-licensing, labour market
regulation, geographic measures and industry concentration for either China or India.
Despite the fact that TFP in manufacturing industries in developing countries, such as
China and India, has been discussed widely, there is little evidence shown for Vietnamese
manufacturing, especially with implications for economic governance reforms.
In exploring agglomeration effects on TFP, Combes et al. (2012) found evidence of
higher TFP growth in larger size cities in France. The authors noted that agglomeration
economies are magnified by the natural local advantages. They also refer to the self-
selection of firms in the tough competition of big cities as the reason for higher productivity
in these urban areas. Nevertheless, Glaeser and Resseger (2010) confirmed that the positive
12see Combes and Gobillon (2015) for the literature survey, and Combes et al. (2012) for the case study
of France
13see Nguyen et al. (2008), and Newman et al. (2014) for the case study of Vietnam; see Anwar and
Nguyen (2014) for FDI spillovers by regions.
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agglomeration effects only in cities that are relatively high-skilled.
Importantly, in a review of institutions and productivity growth history,North (1994)
explained productivity growth as a result from a reduction in transaction costs and trans-
formation costs. North (1994) indicated that the enhancement of institutions is the key
driver of transaction cost elimination. Isaksson (2007) emphasizes the crucial impacts of
better institutions on TFP, especially its benefits for the effectiveness of capital formation
and resource allocation. The study of Isaksson (2007) also referred to other factors that
influence TFP such as infrastructure, human capital, financial development, etc. Clarify-
ing the concepts of economic governance which includes both legislation and institution,
Dixit (2009) highlighted the more important roles of policy application by institutions
over government laws for productivity growth.
In empirical studies, Francois and Manchin (2007) showed the evidence of governance
quality on export levels in the panel of bilateral trade flows, while McCulloch et al. (2013)
attemptted to search for the roles of Indonesian district governance in the local per capita
income. However, McCulloch et al. (2013) did not find robust evidence. The reinforcement
of labour productivity by economic governance is investigated by Djankov et al. (2006)
with the focus on how regulation for the ease of doing business reduces business costs. The
nexus between Indian manufacturing industries’ TFP (estimated by Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003) method) and economic reforms (de-licensing) was investigated by Ghosh (2013).
Ghosh (2013) split the study time frame into pre and post reform periods, and considered
the TFP growth in the context of financial development, tariff escalation, labour market
changes, FDI flows, and the role of union as the institutional proxy. However, Ghosh
(2013) did not find an improvement in manufacturing TFP after the de-lisencing in India.
The author did not consider the economic governance in detail.
For the case of Vietnam, Malesky (2010) investigated how provincial government sup-
port the attraction of FDI flows. The study used the Provincial Competitiveness Index as
the assessment of better government quality in Vietnam. According to Malesky (2010),
the index is similar to indices referred to in common literature. The discussion of Brunetti
et al. (1998) on the linkage between the institutional uncertainty and growth and invest-
ment also used indicator from the world-wide survey on private enterprises. Brunetti et al.
(1998) reported that economic growth and investment were reduced by the government
that lacked of incredibility.
Recent studies of TFP in the Vietnamese manufacturing have mostly focused on the
FDI spillovers (Nguyen et al. (2008), Anwar and Nguyen (2010), Anwar and Nguyen
(2014), and Newman et al. (2015)), or international trade openness (Ha and Kiyota
(2014)). The roles of provincial governance on business formalization and FDI attraction
in Vietnam were documented respectively by Malesky and Taussig (2009) and Malesky
(2010). Nevertheless, few research shows evidence of the influence of economic governance
on provincial manufacturing TFP in developing countries given the impacts of other factors
such as FDI spillovers, agglomeration effects, absorptive capacity, especially for Vietnam
during the impressive economic reforms (2000-2010).
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4 Data Description and Statistical Indicator
4.1 Data Description
4.1.1 Firm-level Data
This paper uses the rich firm-level data on the manufacturing industry drawn from the
Vietnam Enterprise Survey for an eleven year period (2000–2010) and which has been con-
ducted annually by the Vietnam General Statistics Office (GSO).14 Each firm is identified
by a unique id key which are then compiled into an unbalanced panel.15
The industries in the dataset are classified using the 2-digit Vietnam Standard In-
dustrial Classification 1993 (hereafter named VSIC 1993) provided by the Vietnamese
General Statistics Office.16 To overcome the constraint in the number of observations in
some industries, I merge related industries: industry 29 with industry 30, industry 31
with industry 32, industry 33 with industry 34. Industry 15 (the Manufacuture of Food)
includes 4-digit classification 1511-1512 (See Appendix A.1 for more details). Industries
with the high concentration (i.e: consider the Herfindahl Index using labour share), such
as: 16 (Tobacco), 23 (Oil and Refinery Oil products), and 37 (Recycling), are excluded (a
similar practice can be found in Newman et al. (2015)).
The survey contains annual information of legally registered enterprises (including
business establishments) which were still doing business until December 31st in the year
previous to the year reported. The firm-level information in the survey includes: estab-
lishment year, revenue, profit, expenditure, wage bills, number of employees, firm types,
net fixed assets, debt, equity, etc.
Table 2: Firm-level Data Description, 2000-2010
Variable Measurement 2000-2005 2006-2010 2000-2010
Mean N Mean N Mean N
Labour Number of labour 3.63 78,225 3.14 161,927 3.30 240,622
Value added Profit +wage +depreciation 20.02 71,896 19.84 150,153 19.90 222,517
Capital stock Net book value of fixed asset 20.59 71,830 20.35 153,061 20.44 225,360
Inputs Total cost - wage - investment 21.52 64,446 21.42 133,166 21.46 198,075
Source:Data drawn from the Vietnam Enterprise Survey (2000-2010). Industries listed in Appendix A.1.
Notes: The depreciation ratio is 10%. Value added, capital stocks, materials and services are deflated values. All variables are in ln.
Table 2 depicts how key variables are constructed using the Survey on Vietnamese
Firms. The measurement of value added uses firm-level information of total profit, total
wage, and depreciation. The depreciation ratio is assumed to be 10%. Different deflators
are used to convert the nominal values in the current price to the base year price which is
14The data has been aggregated and published annually in the Vietnam Statistical Yearbook. See
more details in: www.gso.gov.vn. Huong Nguyen would like to thank her colleagues: Hanh Pham at the
Middlesex University (the UK) for sharing the raw firm-level data, and Stephan Kyburz at the University of
Bern for sharing the provincial administrative boundary data of Vietnam from the Global Administrative
Areas data (www.gadm.org).
15The identification for firms in the dataset using the code assigned by the GSO for each firms through
years. The tax code was not used because this method records many missing observations.
16VSIC 1993 is in line with the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC Rev.3) which was
introduced by the United Nations. http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/ctryreg/ctrydetail.asp?id=1448
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year 2000. Specifically, the producer price index (PPI) of each industry is used to deflate
output and value added. 17 Capital stocks are converted to the price of base year 2000 by
the gross fixed capital formation deflator. 18 Annual GDP deflators are used for nominal
values of materials and services.19
4.1.2 Province-level Data
Table 3: Province-level Data Description, 2006-2010
Variable Measurement Mean Min Max
Provincial TFP Weighted provincial total factor productivity 1.54 0.03 5.50
PCI (%) Unweighted provincial competitiveness index 55.61 41.64 76.02
Labour Density (LAB) Log of Number of Residents with age 15 years onwards/km2 2.89 0.20 38.88
Log(FDI) Log of Number of FDI projects/number of firms -4.75 -7.66 -1.43
Log(MANU) Log of Share of provincial manufacturing in national manufacturing -0.80 -4.61 3.14
Log(STU) Log of Number of students in colleges and universities 8.79 4.88 13.41
Note:Provincial TFP is scaled down by divided by 106. Missing values for some years in number of students in Dak Nong are
calculated by the average of two nearest years. Missing values in number of students in Dien Bien for several years are replaced by
number of students in vocational school in the same province.
Source:Provincial-level data is downloaded from www.gso.gov.vn. PCI is downloaded from http://eng.pcivietnam.org.
4.2 Statistical Indicator
As discussed in Section 2, the year 2006 (when the new Law on investment was introduced
along with the amendment to the 1999 Law on Enterprises) is an important milestone in
the policy reforms during 2000-2010. Hence for the presentation of relevant statistical
indicators, two phases of policy reform: early phase 2000-2005, and later phase 2006-2010
are chosen for the comparison of changes in economic stylized facts.
4.2.1 Expansion of Number of Firms, Growth in Labour and Real Wage
In the light of more cohesion and greater ease of doing business, the flourishing trend in
the number of registered manufacturing firms from 2000–2010 is shown in Figure 2. Sharp
increase in the number of firms observed since 2006 (shown by the steeper slope). 20
Figure 2 also exhibits the growth in labour and average real wage (base year 2000) for
the research time frame. Interestingly, growth in employment in the manufacturing saw a
more rapid rise than the growth in average real wage, especially after 2006.
In addition, Table 4 shows the percentage share of workers employed by the industries
(in total labour force) increased steadily from 11,8% (2005) to 14,1%(estimated in 2014).
With the development of the industries, more jobs were created during the period studied.
Specifically, the number of workers in manufacturing increased 32.09% during 2005-2010,
17Source: I calculated the Index with base year 2000 by using the annual Producer Price Index (PPI)
by Industry provided by the General Statistic Offices of Vietnam at www.gso.gov.vn
18The calculation of deflators use the annual nominal gross fixed capital formation values of Vietnam
from the World Bank, www.worldbank.org
19Source: The World Economic Outlook, www.imf.org
20This trend is also in line with the boom in total number of registered enterprises (for all sectors) in
Vietnam. According to UNIDO (2011b), by end of 2005, about 170,000 enterprises registered in Vietnam
in comparison to 39,000 enterprises registered between 1990 and 1999.
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Figure 2: Number of Firms, Growth in Labour & Average Real Wage, by Year, 2000-2010
7465
10169
11641
13569
16909
19910
22660
26369
32991
38869
41070
Amended Law on Enterprise 2005 came into effect
New Law on Enterprise 1999 came into effect
WTO member 2007
(Red tape Cut)
(One-stop shop Established at Provincial level)
New Law on Investment 2005 came into effect
10
00
0
20
00
0
30
00
0
40
00
0
N
um
be
r o
f f
irm
s
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Year
.14
.4
.62
.86
.99
1.22
1.46
1.57
1.69
1.9
1.05 1.07
1.15 1.15 1.18
1.24
1.33 1.37
1.44
1.57
New Law on Investment 2005 came into effect
Amended Law on Enterprise 2005 came into effect
(One-stop shop Established at Provincial level)
New Law on Enterprise 1999 came into effect0
.5
1
1.
5
2
G
ro
w
th
 ra
te
 c
om
pa
re
d 
to
 b
as
e 
ye
ar
 2
00
0
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Year
Labour
Real Average Wage
Source: Author’s Calculation using the Vietnam Enterprise Survey (2000-2010).
Note: Selected industries are 2-digit VSIC 1993 (Appendix A.1).
and 12.47% during 2010-2014 (calculation from data in Table 4). This indicates the
more crucial role of the manufacturing industries in the Vietnam economy in terms of job
creation.
Table 4: Employment in the Manufacturing Industries, 2005-2014
Year 2005 2010 2014 Preliminary
Share in labor force (%) 11,8 13,5 14,1
Number of workers (thousand) 5.031,2 6.645,8 7.414,8
Source: The General Statistics Office of Vietnam, website: https://www.gso.gov.vn/default.aspx?tabid=714
4.2.2 Provincial Competitiveness by Province, 2006, 2008 & 2010
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Figure 3: Provincial Competitiveness Index by Province, 2006, 2008 & 2010
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Source: PCI is the unweighted provincial price index which is downloaded from http://eng.pcivietnam.org/. The increasing ranges
of PCI are arranged as follows: (i) less than 10% of the observations, (ii) (10%-25%], (iii) (25%-50%],(iv) (50%-75%], (75%-100%].
Groups (iii) and (iv) are higher than median in the year. Administrative boundaries are based on Global Administrative Areas data
(www.gadm.org). Several Vietnamese islands (e.g. Hoang Sa and Truong Sa) are not displayed due to the limitation of the GADM
administrative boundaries data.
5 Methodology
This section firstly discusses the algorithm to estimate production function for a specific
industry proposed by Wooldridge (2009) and Petrin and Levinsohn (2012).21 As discussed
in detail in Section 2, the year 2006 is the milestones in the economic reforms of Vietnam,
hence production function is estimated in two sub-periods 2001-2005 (the first phase of
development), and 2006-2010 (the second phase of development) 22. Secondly, the section
presents how TFP and TFP difference are measured using the parameters estimated from
the production function. The results of ln(TFP) are then used to group the dataset into
quartiles. For each quartile in the two sub-periods, we investigate its pattern of average
firm size (log of capital), female employment ratio rate, leverage ratio (debt/equity), and
TFP growth rate.
5.1 Estimation of Production Function
Wooldridge (2009) aims to consistently and efficiently estimate the production function
parameters by using the system of two equations (generalized method of moments, GMM).
The author also introduces the IVs estimator which is the special case of GMM when one
21The framework by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) is added for reference in the Appendix ??.
22Because of the lag variable required in the estimation, sub period 1 includes year 2000, sub period 2
includes year 2005
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of the equations is exactly identified.
The IVs estimator is chosen to estimate the production function of the selected Viet-
namese manufacturing industries for several reasons:
(i) The setting shows advantages over 2-stage semi-parametric methods (by Olley and
Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)), and other methods such as OLS, fixed ef-
fects, and Instrumental Variables with external instruments as it enables the estimation
of the production function without concern for the endogeneity issue between inputs and
unobserved productivity as raised by Ackerberg et al. (2006);23
(ii) Most importantly, the framework is a straight forward step to measure TFP that
excludes measurement errors and unpredicted shocks to productivity (See details in Equa-
tion 10 and Sub-section 5.2).
(iii) The framework fits well with the dataset of the Vietnamese manufacturing indus-
tries compiled from the Vietnamese Enterprise Survey. Specifically, it requires information
about observed variables such as value-added, capital stocks, number of workers, and in-
termediate inputs which are available in the dataset.
(iv) However, the limitation of the method to the 2-stage semi-parametric method
by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) is that it requires a larger
number of observations. For example, it is not possible to obtain the production function
estimation for each 4-digit industries.
The algorithm of Wooldridge (2009) is basically similar to the assumptions in the
method of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (and Olley and Pakes (1996)’s method):
(i)The intermediate inputs have increasingly monotonicity in unobserved productivity;
(ii) The unobserved productivity follows Markov rule; (iii) The unknown function of pro-
ductivity is approximated by the third order polynomials function of capital stocks and
intermediate inputs (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003), or investment flows (Olley and Pakes,
1996);(iv) Assumption of constant return to scale in this frame work is relaxed (Petrin
and Levinsohn, 2012).
Importantly, to modify the framework of Wooldridge (2009) and Petrin and Levinsohn
(2012), I include year fixed effects in the estimation of the production function to control
for business cycles. Besides, the cluster-robust standard errors at firm-level is considered
for the robust inference (Cameron and Miller, 2015). Moreover, as discussed regarding
economic reform in Sub-section 2, year 2006 is regarded as the benchmark for important
policy reforms (for instance: decentralization of new business registration and investment
licensing came into effect through the amended Law on Enterprises and the new Law on
Investment in 2006). Therefore, I estimate the TFP for two sub-periods 2001-2005 (the
early phase of the reforms) and 2006-2010 (the second phase of the reforms).
Further details of the TFP estimation algorithm are found in the Appendix A.2.
23See details in papers by Petrin and Levinsohn (2012), and Van Beveren (2012).
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5.2 Measurement of TFP and TFP Gap
Equation 1 presents how ln(TFP) can be calculated from parameters estimated from the
IVs estimator by Wooldridge (2009) and Petrin and Levinsohn (2012). It rules out the
measurement errors of value-added (ijt) and unpredicted shocks of TFP (aijt) that might
be included in the TFP (see also Equation 10).
ˆωijt = ˆvaijt − βˆllijt − βˆkkijt (1)
Where:
ˆωijt: the log of estimated TFP of firm i in industry j at year t. ˆvaijt is the value-added
estimated from the production function. lijt, kijt: log values of number of labours and
real accumulated capital stocks respectively. βˆl: labour parameter, βˆk: capital parameter
estimated from the production function of industry j.
The gap in TFP is measured as the difference in TFP between frontier firms (at 90th,
or 75th percentile of TFP for each industry) and least productive firm (respectively at
10th, or 25th percentile of TFP) :
TFPgap90/10 = ln(TFP )p90 - ln(TFP )p10
24
TFPgap75/25 = ln(TFP )p75 - ln(TFP )p25
Where (for each industry, and (or) within each region):
ln(TFP )p90 : ln(TFP) of the frontier (firm at 90th percentile)
ln(TFP )p10 : ln(TFP) of the least productive (firm at 10th percentile)
ln(TFP )p75 : ln(TFP) of firm at 75th percentile
ln(TFP )p25 : ln(TFP) of firm at 25th percentile
As TFP is expressed in log values, the gap has interesting implication. It can be
inverted to the ratio between the output produced by the TFP frontier and the output
produced by the least productive, assumed that both using the same inputs (Syverson,
2011): Ratio = eTFPgap
Patterns of average firm size (log of real capital stocks), human capital measures (
female to male ratio in the workforce), leverage ratio (debt/equity), and TFP growth
would be investigated for each TFP quartile (the limitation of the panel data used in this
study is the information of skilled labour is missing for most of years). The TFP gap
across industries and key economic regions would also be explored.
24Hsieh and Klenow (2009) exclude firms with 1% highest and 1% lowest values of ln(TFP) to prevent
the outliers. However, I still keep all the observations for the randomness.
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5.3 Estimation of Impacts of Provincial Governance Quality on Provin-
cial TFP
This section first constructs the provincial manufacturing TFP in Vietnam. To calculate
average provincial TFP, while Combes et al. (2012) use the arithmetic mean of firm-level
TFP by province, this study measures provincial weighted average TFP using firm-level
TFP and firm’s labour share in each province. The provincial weighted average TFP not
only reflects the technology efficiency level of each province, but also takes into account
the importance of the firm size in term of labour. The results are then used to analyse
the impacts of the provincial authority’s performance on the improvement of the local
manufacturing efficiency.
Weighted average total factor productivity of province p at time t is calculated as
follows:
TFPpt =
∑
i αipt × TFPipt
Where:
TFPpt is the provincial TFP.
αipt =
Lipt
Lpt
is the labour share of firm i in province p.
TFPipt is the TFP of firm i in province p at time t.
North (1994) reviewed the role of institutions in productivity enhancement and dis-
cussed the lowering of firm’s transaction cost due to the improved performance of the
government authority. Notably, Djankov et al. (2006) confirmed that growth is brought
about by the ease of doing business which reduces business cost for firms. Moreover, previ-
ous studies in agglomeration economies commonly indicate that total factor productivity
is higher in bigger cities in France (Combes et al. (2012)), and larger size cities gains
more labour productivity (Glaeser (2010)). In addition, literature shows that more skilful
individuals tend to cluster in urban cities (Combes et al. (2012), and Berry and Glaeser
(2005)). Importantly, in the studies of the Vietnamese manufacturing, Newman et al.
(2015), Anwar and Nguyen (2014), or Nguyen et al. (2008) found the positive spillovers
of FDI in Vietnam. Following the literature, Equation 2 considers the influence of the
improvement in local government quality on provincial technology efficiency in the con-
text of labour density (agglomeration effects), and FDI spillovers. Other variables are
added to control for the economics capacity of the province, such as the share of provin-
cial manufacturing on national manufacturing output, and number of undergraduates and
colleges.
TFPpt = α0 + αpciPCIp,t + αxXp,t−1 + αpPROVp + pt (2)
Where: TFPpt is the weighted average provincial TFP of province p at time t. It
implies the level of technology efficiency in manufacturing of the province. 25
25Similar approach of TFP level analysis can be found in Newman et al. (2015).
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Xp,t−1 includes lagged variables controlling for:
(i) Agglomeration effects are proxied by labour density (number of residents whose age
is 15 years upwards per km2 by province, LABp,t−1).
(ii) FDI spillovers by province (the presence of foreign firms in each province: ratio of
foreign projects registered over total number of firms locating in the province, FDIp,t−1).
(iii) Absorptive capacity of the province (number of university and college students by
province STUp,t−1. 26
(iv) Manufacturing intensity is measured by the share of provincial manufacturing
output in national total manufacturing output, MANUp,t−1). This variable can also be
proxied for the industrialization of each province.
(v) Distance Distpq,t from province p to an elite province q is measured by the shortest
geodetic distance between two centroids of province p and province q. I then use an inverse
weighted approach to sum up TFPq,t−1 over q in year t − 1. The elite province q is the
province that gained TFPq,t higher than the fourth quartile (75th) of TFP value in year
t. Using the weight by the inverse of distance assumes the decay effects of the distance to
elites on TFP. 27
DISTpq,t−1 =
∑
q,q 6=p
TFPq,t−1
Distpq,t−1
(3)
Lagged variables of X are exploited to ensure the causal link between the dependent
variables (change in TFP level, and the TFP growth) with explanatory variables so that
Equation 2 and Equation 4 can prevent endogeneity issues that may occur between the
current TFPp,t and the Xp,t.
The province fixed effects PROVp control for the time-invariant effects in each province.
This could be provincial characteristics such as business culture, natural advantages, and
location advantages, etc. Notably, the province effects could influence the choice of location
of firms (either foreign or domestics), and labours. In other words, E[Xp,t−1PROVp] 6=
0. Hence to remove the province fixed effects is essential. Equation 4 shows the first
differencing is used to remove these effects. First differencing is chosen as it could reduce
the serial correlation when excluding lagged values from both sides.
In the literature, the interaction of the province effects variable and the year effects
variable is used to absorb the effects of decentralization to the province (for an example,
see Ahrend et al. (2014)). However, the interaction could not indicate specifically how the
impacts of changes in provincial policies were. To evaluate the impacts in more details, I
include the provincial competitive index PCIpt instead of using the interaction of province
and time effects. The change in the index could be used as the proxy for the improvement
in quality of the provincial economics governance. The index has been measured since
26In the case of Daknong province, as there are several missing values for some years, we calculate the
values of the missing years by the average value of the two nearest years. Dienbien also has missing values,
I replace missing values with number of students in vocational school.
27For examples of research in inverse weighted distance approach, see Keller (2002), Halpern and Mu-
rakozy (2007), and Bodman and Le (2013).
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2005 using annual survey of private enterprises (including both domestic and FDI firms)
by the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry. 28
PCIp,t is regarded as the voice of enterprise communities to assess their local gover-
nance, and for local governments to review and improve the quality of economics gov-
ernance.29 The index is the combination of indicators for the assessment of provincial
governance reform:(i) Cost for business start-up, (ii) Accessibility of land and security of
business premises, (iii) Transparency of business environment and information, (iv) Infor-
mal charges, (v) Waiting time for bureaucratic compliance, (vi) Crowding out of private
enterprise due to favourable policies for foreign and state-owned firms, (vii) Creative and
proactive provincial leadership, (viii) Quality of support services,(ix) Local labour training
and education support policies,(x) Dispute settlement procedure. 30
In Equation 2, PCI is observed at time t. The timing of PCIp,t follows Acemoglu
et al. (2006, p.6) such that good quality of government at time t induces better economics
performance at time t. This setting is reasonable as the improvement of local governance
during the year reduces cost for enterprises (North, 1994). In addition, Greenstone et al.
(2010) noted that firms choose a location to maximize their profit, hence provinces with
better governance will be under their consideration when they make location choice.
It is doubtful for the concern of endogeneity between TFPp,t and PCIp,t. First, PCIp,t
is the index reflecting the opinions of randomly chosen enterprises for the quality of the
local governance during year t while TFPp,t is realized at the end of year t.
31. Second, as
noted in annual PCI reports,32 the quality of local governance changes slowly and stably,
hence it is assumed that PCIp,t could not be influenced quickly by TFPp,t in the same
year. In short, in our estimation, the timing of PCIp,t happened before the realized of
TFPp,t.
The condition for the unbiased estimation of Equation 2 and Equation 4 is that inde-
pendent variables are orthogonal with the error terms pt.
First differencing Equation 2 yields:33
4TFPpt = α0 + αpci4PCIp,t + αx4Xp,t−1 +4pt (4)
The robustness check is conducted by running regression of the same dependent vari-
ables (change in level of TFP) on the current and future values of independent variables.
28The first year survey was only implemented with selected provinces. Relevant informa-
tion can be downloaded from the website of the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry,
http://eng.pcivietnam.org/gioi-thieu-pci-c2.html.
29See the most recent reports on PCI at http://eng.pcivietnam.org/.
30See Malesky (2010) for more discussion of the index, and annual report on PCI at www.pcivietnam.org.
31TFP is estimated using realized input values of firms at the end of year t. See further details ins ection
4.1.1, and section 5.1. TFP is also assumed to be observed only by the firm itself.
32See details at www.pcivietnam.org.
33Year effects are not included in Equation 2 and Equation 4 because in estimating the TFP, the effects
were already controlled. The interaction between year and municipality is added to control for different
time trends between municipal and non-municipal areas. The interaction between year and province is
not added as the change in provincial-level policies are proxied by PCIp,t. Moreover, the provincial level
dataset is constrained by number of observations.
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6 Empirical Result
6.1 Capital Intensity, Leverage Ratio, Gender Ratio in Employment and
TFP growth in TFP Quartiles by Industry
First, the dataset is divided into quartiles based on firm-level ln(TFP) (the first quartile:
0-25%; the second quartile: 25%-median; the third quartile: median-75%, the fourth
quartile: 75%-100%). This section then explores in detail the pattern of average (i)
firm size (log of capital), (ii) capital intensity (log of capital/wage), (iii) gender ratio
of employment (female employees/total employees), and (iv) TFP growth in quartiles of
ln(TFP) for each industry in two sub-periods. Those factors are mentioned commonly in
previous studies as the key drivers of firm-level TFP growth (see, for example Isaksson
(2007) for a review of factors influencing TFP growth such as capital intensity, and Fox
and Smeets (2011) for a discussion of gender ratio roles in influencing TFP gap).
In both sub-periods (early phase: 2000-2005, and second phase: 2006-2010), producers
at TFP frontier (the fourth quartile) were on average in a larger sized firm. More pro-
ductive manufacturers mostly obtained a higher rate of growth (except for industries: 22
(low-technology), and 24, 29, 33 (high technology) in the first phase; and except for 18,
20, 22 (low-technology), and 24, 29, and 36 (high technology) in the second phase of the
reforms).
Interestingly, leading productivity groups in some industries observed higher female to
male ratio in their employment. Specifically, the higher female ratio saw in low-technology
industries such as the manufacture of food (both phases), textile (the first phase), wearing
apparel (both phases), products of wood (both phases), products of furniture and other
n.e.c manufacturing (both phases).
The leverage ratio which implies greater accessibility to credits observed a rising trend
on average, but did not show the increasing trend in all TFP frontier groups in a specific
industry.
In both sub-periods, capital intensity was higher in the better performing groups in
high-technology industries.
6.2 TFP Gap by Industry and Key Economic Region
Table 6 provides more information about the TFP gaps between the 75th and 25th per-
centiles, and 90th and 10th percentiles across industries in four key economic regions
(Northern, Central, Mekong River Delta, and Southern) in two phases of the reforms
(sub-periods). These key economic regions were assigned by the government since 1997
to take advantages of the local region’s natural resources and comparative advantages as
well as to support for other satellite provinces.
Notably, industries in low technology intensity (ranked 1) recorded lower gaps com-
pared to higher technology intensity (ranked 2: medium-low, ranked 3: medium-high,
and ranked 4: high-technology). Most importantly, it is shown in Table 6 that TFP dis-
parity in the early phase of the reforms (2000-2005) was much larger than in the second
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Table 5: Capital Intensity, Gender Ratio in Labour, Leverage Ratio, and TFP growth by
Quartiles of ln(TFP), 2001-2010
Industry 15 17 18 19 20 21 22 24 25 26 27 28 29 31 33 34 36 All
Sub-period 1 (2001-2005)
The First Quartile
Log(capital) 19.20 19.66 19.28 19.86 18.39 19.54 18.71 18.63 19.40 18.70 19.69 18.74 19.21 19.34 19.24 18.93 18.70 19.01
Female ratio 0.41 0.55 0.68 0.53 0.26 0.38 0.41 0.37 0.34 0.42 0.20 0.23 0.21 0.32 0.34 0.20 0.28 0.37
Capital Intensity 2.04 1.18 0.33 0.46 0.87 1.11 0.60 0.35 1.12 0.98 1.20 0.66 0.75 0.56 0.20 0.72 0.70 0.86
Leverage ratio 0.46 1.02 0.45 0.91 1.21 1.22 0.51 0.22 1.01 0.39 1.51 0.64 0.89 2.59 1.70 0.71 0.29 0.77
TFP growth (%) 0.03 -0.09 0.09 0.05 -0.03 -0.06 0.09 0.06 -0.12 -0.04 -0.28 -0.04 -0.09 0.06 0.28 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02
The Second Quartile
Log(capital) 20.21 20.58 20.35 21.56 19.13 20.34 19.50 20.19 20.59 19.73 20.42 19.51 19.97 20.95 20.46 19.91 19.46 20.01
Female ratio 0.47 0.62 0.77 0.69 0.29 0.35 0.40 0.34 0.35 0.41 0.15 0.22 0.20 0.30 0.30 0.17 0.33 0.38
Capital Intensity 1.30 0.89 -0.36 -0.02 0.61 1.00 0.52 0.59 1.17 0.76 0.89 0.53 0.40 0.92 0.47 0.41 0.24 0.61
Leverage ratio 1.98 3.29 2.58 0.43 1.26 2.34 4.14 1.91 2.03 0.98 3.65 1.13 -3.66 5.16 1.09 1.66 1.69 1.82
TFP growth (%) 0.05 -0.01 0.20 0.09 0.03 0.07 0.15 0.18 -0.07 0.05 -0.10 0.01 0.02 0.15 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.06
The Third Quartile
Log(capital) 21.39 22.19 21.91 22.76 19.93 21.32 20.66 22.11 21.65 21.09 21.62 20.51 21.35 22.68 22.39 21.83 20.88 21.32
Female ratio 0.62 0.65 0.82 0.79 0.36 0.31 0.43 0.34 0.35 0.37 0.15 0.22 0.20 0.39 0.43 0.25 0.45 0.42
Capital Intensity 0.77 1.19 0.10 -0.03 0.45 1.20 0.61 1.16 1.32 0.68 1.33 0.64 0.72 1.14 1.46 0.92 0.34 0.74
Leverage ratio 2.37 2.83 2.01 13.98 5.49 2.13 -0.61 1.24 2.63 2.18 28.19 1.73 3.25 1.88 0.83 1.48 2.32 3.18
TFP growth (%) 0.08 0.02 0.18 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.16 0.13 -0.03 0.06 -0.12 0.07 0.08 0.13 0.28 0.11 0.11 0.09
The Fourth Quartile
Log(capital) 23.25 24.42 23.40 24.20 21.69 23.13 22.68 23.75 23.76 23.53 24.14 22.76 23.13 24.43 24.85 24.29 22.83 23.31
Female ratio 0.72 0.65 0.83 0.80 0.46 0.34 0.43 0.40 0.42 0.30 0.16 0.23 0.25 0.45 0.53 0.26 0.51 0.45
Capital Intensity 0.69 1.73 0.20 0.08 0.46 1.51 0.85 1.12 1.78 1.24 1.76 1.22 0.94 1.33 1.85 1.63 0.40 1.03
Leverage ratio 3.20 4.13 1.97 2.13 4.58 0.63 0.69 2.02 2.26 8.44 2.26 5.47 2.94 2.96 -7.01 3.83 2.72 3.61
TFP growth (%) 0.12 0.04 0.20 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.12 -0.04 0.07 -0.08 0.09 0.05 0.14 0.11 0.16 0.12 0.09
Sub-period 2 (2006-2010)
The First Quartile
Log(capital) 19.57 19.52 19.02 19.29 19.01 20.11 18.77 19.11 19.85 19.81 20.37 19.02 19.09 19.44 18.48 19.82 18.88 19.32
Female ratio 0.48 0.60 0.69 0.61 0.36 0.39 0.41 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.34 0.35 0.25 0.33 0.39
Capital Intensity 1.54 0.83 0.20 -0.01 0.89 1.51 0.66 0.78 1.33 1.21 1.36 0.68 0.62 0.79 -0.19 1.07 0.57 0.86
Leverage ratio 1.07 1.46 2.52 1.22 1.35 3.01 0.93 0.48 1.17 0.79 -6.37 1.05 1.19 1.18 3.04 2.13 1.24 1.18
TFP growth (%) -0.07 -0.22 0.20 0.01 -0.19 -0.21 -0.10 -0.06 -0.11 -0.03 -0.16 -0.04 0.04 -0.02 0.13 -0.04 0.13 -0.05
The Second Quartile
Log(capital) 20.27 20.27 19.71 20.74 19.44 20.66 19.31 19.94 20.39 20.50 20.81 19.41 19.84 20.60 19.65 20.70 19.69 19.98
Female ratio 0.53 0.57 0.71 0.62 0.37 0.36 0.41 0.35 0.40 0.38 0.19 0.23 0.22 0.37 0.39 0.26 0.35 0.39
Capital Intensity 1.23 1.04 0.02 0.20 0.76 1.49 0.79 0.72 1.25 0.97 1.29 0.58 0.66 0.85 0.20 0.93 0.59 0.79
Leverage ratio 1.97 1.80 1.78 3.02 1.29 1.70 1.08 2.51 2.21 1.62 1.82 1.63 1.79 0.73 7.05 4.44 1.45 1.83
TFP growth (%) -0.01 0.00 0.26 0.08 -0.12 -0.08 -0.05 0.08 0.01 0.04 -0.05 0.03 0.15 0.08 0.21 0.07 0.19 0.04
The Third Quartile
Log(capital) 21.45 21.33 20.82 22.00 19.81 21.19 19.93 21.46 21.31 21.29 21.47 19.99 20.60 22.23 20.51 21.71 20.76 20.86
Female ratio 0.59 0.57 0.76 0.69 0.36 0.36 0.42 0.35 0.40 0.35 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.38 0.38 0.28 0.41 0.41
Capital Intensity 1.07 1.11 -0.29 0.07 0.61 1.31 0.79 1.19 1.35 0.82 1.42 0.54 0.61 1.19 0.18 0.84 0.49 0.75
Leverage ratio 3.85 0.45 2.88 2.76 1.80 1.79 3.18 2.93 3.20 1.73 37.97 2.06 1.77 2.48 1.57 5.58 7.31 3.79
TFP growth (%) -0.02 -0.02 0.25 0.08 -0.06 -0.01 0.03 0.09 0.04 0.08 -0.08 0.07 0.17 0.14 0.27 0.12 0.18 0.07
The Fourth Quartile
Log(capital) 23.34 23.72 22.73 23.57 21.07 22.49 21.40 23.52 23.32 22.96 23.45 22.22 22.82 23.95 22.89 24.34 22.88 22.76
Female ratio 0.62 0.58 0.80 0.72 0.36 0.34 0.43 0.35 0.42 0.27 0.20 0.26 0.28 0.43 0.61 0.27 0.49 0.42
Capital Intensity 1.06 1.80 -0.09 0.11 0.67 1.34 0.70 1.34 1.65 1.09 1.84 1.24 1.01 1.23 0.84 1.74 0.68 1.04
Leverage ratio 2.82 3.93 2.92 2.16 3.01 3.44 168.65 2.21 7.51 2.31 3.72 13.41 2.78 17.87 6.44 6.63 9.63 17.34
TFP growth (%) 0.01 0.03 0.21 0.09 -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.16 0.17 0.29 0.13 0.11 0.08
Source: Author’s compilation using the Vietnamese Enterprise Survey 2000-2005. List of selected industries is in Appendix A.1.
phase (2006-2010). The TFP catch-up might be induced by the more competition in the
industries after the economic reforms.34
To be more specific, taking the exponential of 0.74, which is the average TFPgap75/25
of the manufacture of wood products in the Northern key economic region (2001-2005),
we could obtain the output ratio is 2.09:1 for 75th:25th percentile firms. In the second
sub-period, the ratio drops to 1.33:1. For the group of highest technology intensity in the
Northern region, the manufacture of chemical products reported the ratio at extremely
high value 13.5:1, and then 2.41:1 respectively in the first and the second sub-periods. The
huge gap in TFP between the two periods was narrowed down. This probably indicates
34The Northern key economic region includes Hanoi, Haiphong, Vinhphuc, Bacninh, Hung Yen, Quangn-
inh, Haiduong. The Central key economic region consists of Danang, Thuathienhue, Quangnam, Quangn-
gai, Binhdinh. The Mekong River Delta economic region covers the area of Cantho, Angiang, Kiengiang,
Camau. Cities in the Southern economic region are Hochiminh, Dongnai, Baria-Vungtau, Binhduong,
Binhphuoc, Tayninh, Longan, Tiengiang.
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the evidence of the faster catch-up of the least productive firms in the second phase of
reforms. These findings of catch-up are shown for all regions including non-key economics
areas.
In the literature, as documented by Syverson (2004), the case of 4-digits industry
in the US (1977) shows that the TFP gap was 0.651. This implies the output ratio of
90th percentile firm and 10th percentile firms was 1.92 given firms using the same input.
The ratio calculated for the US manufacturing (1963-1977) by Collard-Wexler (2011) was
4:1 (TFP was predicted as residuals from the OLS method) and 2:1 (used method of
Ackerberg et al. (2006)). In other research, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) report the 75th:25th
percentiles’ output ratio equal to 5.0:1 in India (1995), 3.6:1 in China (2005), and 3.2:1 in
the US (1997) for manufacturing in general.
25
T
ab
le
6:
T
F
P
G
ap
b
y
In
d
u
st
ry
an
d
K
ey
E
co
n
om
ic
R
eg
io
n
,
20
01
-2
01
0
R
a
n
k
In
d
u
st
ry
N
o
rt
h
e
rn
C
e
n
tr
a
l
S
o
u
th
e
rn
M
e
k
o
n
g
D
e
lt
a
O
th
e
rs
2
0
0
1
-2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
-2
0
1
0
2
0
0
1
-2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
-2
0
1
0
2
0
0
1
-2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
-2
0
1
0
2
0
0
1
-2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
-2
0
1
0
2
0
0
1
-2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
-2
0
1
0
7
5
/
2
5
9
0
/
1
0
7
5
/
2
5
9
0
/
1
0
7
5
/
2
5
9
0
/
1
0
7
5
/
2
5
9
0
/
1
0
7
5
/
2
5
9
0
/
1
0
7
5
/
2
5
9
0
/
1
0
7
5
/
2
5
9
0
/
1
0
7
5
/
2
5
9
0
/
1
0
7
5
/
2
5
9
0
/
1
0
7
5
/
2
5
9
0
/
1
0
1
P
ro
d
u
ct
of
W
o
o
d
0.
74
1.
50
0.
29
0.
57
1.
08
1.
84
0.
30
0
.7
7
1.
08
2.
06
0.
35
0.
71
0.
5
0
0.
83
0
.4
0
0
.7
6
0.
86
1.
7
0
0
.3
2
0.
6
2
1
F
u
rn
it
u
re
,
m
an
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
N
.e
.c
0.
77
1.
50
0.
30
0.
62
1.
32
2.
50
0.
45
0
.8
8
1.
19
2.
15
0.
45
0.
84
1.
6
0
2.
20
0
.2
1
0
.5
9
0.
96
2.
0
3
0
.3
0
0.
6
2
1
F
o
o
d
p
ro
d
u
ct
s
0.
80
1.
90
0.
43
0
.7
8
0.
91
1.
92
0.
60
0.
85
1.
12
2.
41
0.
5
7
1
.0
7
1.
2
5
3
.0
1
0.
70
1.
25
1.
31
2.
42
0.
52
1.
03
1
P
ap
er
p
ro
d
u
ct
s
0.
89
1.
70
0.
35
0.
76
0.
82
1.
75
0.
42
0.
69
1
.0
3
2.
1
3
0
.3
9
0.
8
3
1.
01
1.
57
0.
46
0.
83
1.
35
2.
12
0.
3
9
0
.7
9
1
T
an
n
in
g
&
D
re
ss
in
g
of
L
ea
th
er
1.
12
2.
25
0.
32
0.
58
1.
48
2.
44
0.
41
0
.7
3
1.
04
1.
98
0.
36
0.
68
0.
6
4
1.
81
0
.5
2
0
.7
5
1.
38
2.
2
5
0
.2
6
0.
6
2
1
P
u
b
li
sh
in
g,
P
ri
n
ti
n
g
&
R
ep
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
of
R
ec
or
d
ed
M
ed
ia
1.
13
2.
05
0.
24
0.
57
1.
00
1.
62
0.
45
0
.7
3
1.
25
2.
25
0.
29
0.
67
1.
0
5
2.
14
0
.2
9
0
.5
9
1.
08
1.
7
4
0
.2
9
0.
5
7
1
T
ex
ti
le
s
1.
25
2.
27
0.
40
0
.9
1
1.
48
2.
69
0.
37
0.
84
1.
25
2.
38
0.
44
0
.9
0
0.
9
5
2
.1
6
0.
3
5
1.
13
1.
34
2.
24
0.
47
0.
93
1
W
ea
ri
n
g
A
p
p
ar
el
D
re
ss
in
g,
D
y
in
g
of
F
u
r
1.
44
2.
28
0.
32
0.
62
1.
23
2.
03
0.
37
0
.6
4
1
.0
1
1.
9
8
0
.3
0
0.
52
1.
26
2.
52
0.
24
0.
52
0.
87
1
.8
5
0.
2
9
0
.5
5
2
B
as
ic
m
et
al
s
1.
03
2.
00
0.
41
0.
94
0.
65
1.
50
0.
34
0
.7
1
1.
42
2.
77
0.
40
1.
19
1.
3
3
1.
52
0
.9
2
1
.1
4
1.
14
2.
6
1
0
.3
7
0.
8
2
2
R
u
b
b
er
&
P
la
st
ic
p
ro
d
u
ct
1.
04
2.
26
0.
40
0.
81
0.
99
2.
25
0.
39
0
.7
2
1.
28
2.
24
0.
43
0.
82
1.
5
7
2.
09
0
.3
1
0
.5
3
0.
92
1.
4
5
0
.3
3
0.
7
3
2
F
ab
ri
ca
te
d
M
et
al
p
ro
d
u
ct
s
1.
08
2.
11
0.
29
0.
70
0.
64
1
.4
2
0
.2
8
0
.5
4
1
.1
0
2.
15
0.
37
0.
77
0.
67
1.
27
0.
20
0
.3
9
0.
7
8
1
.7
6
0.
2
8
0.
54
2
O
th
er
n
on
-m
et
al
ic
p
ro
d
u
ct
s
1.
54
2.
80
0.
54
1
.0
8
1.
35
2.
94
0.
41
0.
97
1.
39
2.
60
0.
54
1
.0
9
1.
9
6
3
.1
4
0.
9
6
1.
31
1.
36
2.
35
0.
43
0.
83
3
M
ot
or
V
eh
ic
le
s,
T
ra
il
er
s,
S
em
it
ra
il
er
s
O
th
er
tr
an
sp
or
t
eq
u
ip
m
en
ts
1.
82
3.
15
0.
83
1.
53
1.
29
2.
43
0.
59
1
.3
5
1.
98
3.
20
0.
56
1.
16
0.
8
8
2.
18
0
.4
7
0
.9
0
1.
16
2.
2
1
0
.5
7
1.
1
3
3
C
h
em
ic
al
p
ro
d
u
ct
s
2.
32
3.
41
0.
88
1.
81
1.
63
2.
86
0.
85
1
.6
7
2.
04
3.
27
1.
00
1.
80
1.
8
4
3.
87
0
.7
8
1
.8
4
2.
14
3.
6
0
1
.0
2
1.
8
2
4
M
ac
h
in
ar
y,
E
q
u
ip
m
en
t,
O
ffi
ce
,
A
cc
ou
n
ti
n
g
&
C
om
p
u
ti
n
g
m
ac
h
in
e
1.
67
2.
65
0.
60
1
.0
2
0
.8
5
1
.1
0
0
.3
1
0.
87
1.
30
2.
34
0.
47
0.
91
1.
10
2
.5
3
0.
5
7
0
.9
2
1.
24
2.
33
0.
40
0.
83
4
M
ed
ic
al
,
p
re
ci
si
on
an
d
op
ti
ca
l
in
st
ru
m
en
t
1.
69
3.
39
0.
55
1.
05
0.
72
0.
72
0
.4
4
0
.5
1
2
.8
5
4.
0
1
0
.6
3
1.
19
N
/A
N
/
A
N
/A
N
/
A
1
.1
2
1.
74
0.
59
1.
01
4
E
le
ct
ri
ca
l
M
ac
h
in
er
y
&
A
p
p
ar
at
u
s;
T
V
,
co
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
eq
u
ip
m
en
t
2.
06
3.
47
0.
99
1.
61
1.
18
1.
18
0.
74
1
.3
1
2.
05
3.
55
0.
93
1.
67
0.
7
7
0.
81
0
.4
6
0
.5
7
1.
45
2.
8
0
0
.7
2
1.
1
3
N
o
te
s:
A
u
th
o
r’
s
c
o
m
p
il
a
ti
o
n
u
si
n
g
d
a
ta
d
ra
w
n
fr
o
m
th
e
V
ie
tn
a
m
e
se
E
n
te
rp
ri
se
S
u
rv
e
y
2
0
0
0
–
2
0
1
0
fo
r
tw
o
su
b
-p
e
ri
o
d
s.
9
0
/
1
0
is
th
e
T
F
P
g
a
p
b
e
tw
e
e
n
fi
rm
a
t
9
0
th
a
n
d
1
0
th
p
e
rc
e
n
ti
le
s.
7
5
/
2
5
is
th
e
T
F
P
g
a
p
b
e
tw
e
e
n
fi
rm
a
t
7
5
th
a
n
d
2
5
th
p
e
rc
e
n
ti
le
s.
R
a
n
k
is
th
e
g
ro
u
p
o
f
te
c
h
n
o
lo
g
y
in
te
n
si
ty
:
1
(L
o
w
te
c
h
n
o
lo
g
y
),
2
(M
e
d
iu
m
-l
o
w
te
c
h
n
o
lo
g
y
),
3
(M
e
d
iu
m
-h
ig
h
te
c
h
n
o
lo
g
y
),
a
n
d
4
(H
ig
h
te
c
h
n
o
lo
g
y
).
T
h
e
ra
n
k
is
a
rr
a
n
g
e
d
b
y
th
e
a
u
th
o
r,
b
a
si
c
a
ll
y
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
th
e
O
E
C
D
’s
c
o
n
c
e
p
ts
o
f
IS
IC
R
e
v
3
te
c
h
n
o
lo
g
y
in
te
n
si
ty
.
26
6.3 Impacts of Provincial Governance Quality on Provincial TFP
This part investigates whether quality of provincial governance influenced the weighted
average productivity by provinces. The investigation takes a closer look at the reforms of
provincial authority (“one-stop shop”) in the ease of doing business. This performance of
local governments is proxied by the Provincial Competitiveness Index.
6.3.1 Correlation Between Provincial TFP and Provincial Competitiveness
Index
Figures 4 & 5 exhibit the positive correlation between the weighted average TFP by
province and the provincial competitiveness index (both are in log values) for year 2006
and year 2010.
Interestingly, Figure 4 &5 indicate pattern of the local governance quality between
2006 and 2010. The leading provincial authorities in business reforms in 2006 were in
Da Nang, Dong Nai, Binh Duong, Binh Dinh, Vinh Long, Lao Cai. The list of the best
local authorities in 2010, which includes Dong Thap, Da Nang, Binh Duong, Tra Vinh,
and Lao Cai did not change greatly in comparison to year 2006. Big cities such as Hanoi,
Hochiminh city, were unfortunately not included. However, in the list of the left-behind
provinces in PCI (2006): Kon Tum, Quang Ngai, Dak Nong, Dien Bien, Ha Tinh, and
Bac Lieu. Only Quang Ngai and Dak Nong were still in the least competitive provinces
(2010). Other least PCI provinces (2010) are Lang Son, Lai Chau, Hung Yen, and Bac
Kan.35
35Additional investigation in the nexus between the density of the province and the provincial TFP is
presented in Appendix A.3.
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Figure 4: Correlation between PCI and Provincial TFP, 2006
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Selected 2-digit industries in Appendix A.1.
Figure 5: Correlation between PCI and Provincial TFP, 2010
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6.3.2 Baseline Results
The result from the first differencing model, which controls for provincial labour density
and the FDI spillovers, confirms the significant impacts of local governance quality on the
improvement of productivity (see Table 7, column (1) and (2)). The results also exhibit
the significance of FDI spillovers which is proxied by the ratio of number of FDI projects
over total number of firms by provinces (in all sectors). The coefficients of FDI spillovers
variable are higher than the coefficient induced from the variable that is proxied for better
quality of the local governance. On the other hand, the coefficient of labour density is
positive but insignificant.36 Column (3) in Table 7 indicates the insignificance of lagged
provincial TFP in the model when using the first differencing. Non-linear linkage between
economic growth rate and development index is common in previous studies (for example,
see : Samargandi et al. (2015) for the case of financial development index). Nevertheless,
column (4) in Table 7 shows that adding the square of provincial governance quality does
not fit the model. Hence there is little evidence of non-linear relationship between TFP
level and the economics governance index in the case of Vietnam.
Table 8 exhibits more details of the empirical results for different groups.37
The findings in column (1) and column (2) in Table 8 show that local governance
with upper PCI would significantly induces influences on provincial productivity while
column (3) & (4) indicate that upper productivity provinces benefited more from the
quality of local governance. Column (5) & (6) (Table 8) further confirm that provinces
with advanced TFP and better quality of governance significantly benefited more from
the local governance in ease of doing business than lower productivity provinces. Never-
theless, insignificant results for provincial governance quality in column (7) & (8) (Table
8) demonstrate that either upper or lower productivity provinces with lower governance
quality did not gain benefits from the business regulation reforms of local authorities.
36Literature at country-level indicated that better institutions positively influence long-run growth in
GDP per capital (for instant, see Le (2009), and Rodrik et al. (2004)). Differently, McCulloch and Malesky
(2011) did not find robust evidence between the improvement of authority at district level and the economic
performance in Indonesia. In a case study of China, the research of Wilson (2016) did not show significant
impacts of the improvement in government quality on provincial growth in China during the post-Mao
period (1985-2005).
37
Column (1) Upper PCI: provinces that had PCI higher than the median value in each year.
Column (2) Lower PCI: provinces that had PCI lower or equal than the median value in each year.
Column (3) Upper productivity: provinces that gained TFP higher than median value in each year.
Column (4) Lower productivity: provinces that obtained TFP lower than or equal to the median value
in each year.
Column (5) Upper PCI & Upper TFP: provinces had better quality of governance and upper productivity
in each year.
Column (6) Upper PCI & Lower TFP.
Column (7) Lower PCI & Lower TFP.
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Table 7: Baseline Estimation A
Provincial TFP 4TFPp,t (1) (2) (3) (4)
Provincial governance 4PCIp,t 0.023* 0.025* 0.024* -0.01
quality (2.29) (2.54) (2.50) (-0.11)
Labour density 4LABp,t−1 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.004
(1.23) (0.91) (0.18) (0.80)
FDI projects/number 4FDIp,t−1 0.367+ 0.329+ 0.292 0.332+
of firms (1.85) (1.66) (1.56) (1.68)
Number of students in 4STUp,t−1 -0.015 -0.013 -0.006 -0.014
colleges and universities (-0.29) (-0.27) (-0.12) (-0.29)
Share in national 4MANUp,t−1 0.308 0.322 0.27 0.309
manufacturing output (0.92) (0.92) (0.79) (0.84)
Provincial TFP 4TFPp,t−1 -0.168
(-1.32)
Provincial governance 4PCIp,t−1 0.00
quality (square) (0.40)
Year # Municipality Yes Yes Yes
Cluster (Province) Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 183 183 182 183
R-sq 0.11 0.147 0.229 0.148
Note: t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.1; ∗p < 0.05; ∗ ∗ p < 0.01; ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
Source: Author’s compilation using data drawn from the Vietnamese Enterprise Survey 2005-2010 and provincial
data downloaded from www.gso.gov.vn. The weighted average provincial TFP level is scaled down by being divided
by 106. Upper productive provinces are those have TFP > median. Lower productive provinces are those have
TFP ≤ median. The unweighted Provincial Competitiveness Index is downloaded from http://eng.pcivietnam.org.
Table 8: Baseline Estimation B
Provincial TFP 4TFPp,t (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Upper PCI Lower PCI Upper TFP Lower TFP Upper PCI Upper PCI Lower PCI Lower PCI
Upper TFP Lower TFP Upper TFP Lower TFP
Provincial governance 4PCIp,t 0.038** 0.008 0.051** 0.015+ 0.064** 0.016+ 0.032 0.013
quality (2.73) (0.47) (3.01) (1.92) (3.19) (1.68) (1.05) (0.90)
Labour density 4LABp,t−1 0.134 0.008+ 0.003 -0.362 0.131 -0.231 0.016 -0.691
(1.62) (1.65) (0.36) (-0.78) (1.09) (-0.77) (1.56) (-0.39)
FDI projects/number 4FDIp,t−1 -0.022 0.641* 0.343 0.152 -0.277 0.054 1.050 0.267
of firms (-0.09) (2.22) (0.78) (1.09) (-0.65) (0.42) (1.49) (1.09)
Number of students in 4STUp,t−1 -0.031 -0.014 -0.006 -0.017 0.118 -0.107* -0.085 0.042
colleges and universities (-0.47) (-0.21) (-0.06) (-0.40) (0.78) (-1.97) (-0.56) (1.27)
Share in national 4MANUp,t−1 0.537 0.142 0.267 0.270+ 1.114 0.372 -0.374 0.267
manufacturing output (1.27) (0.34) (0.42) (1.71) (1.11) (1.17) (-0.59) (1.02)
Year # Municipality Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster (Province) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 92 91 93 90 53 39 40 51
R-sq 0.269 0.210 0.169 0.034 0.387 0.330 0.260 0.099
Note: t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.1; ∗p < 0.05; ∗ ∗ p < 0.01; ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
Source: Author’s compilation using data drawn from the Vietnamese Enterprise Survey 2005-2010 and provincial
data downloaded from www.gso.gov.vn. The weighted average provincial TFP level is scaled down by being divided
by 106. Upper PCI are PCI which is higher than median value. Lower PCI are PCI which is lower than median
value. Upper productive provinces are those have TFP > median. Lower productive provinces are those have TFP
≤ median. The unweighted Provincial Competitiveness Index is downloaded from http://eng.pcivietnam.org.
In Table 9, I added a control variable DISTp,t−1 which is the sum of inverse weighted
distance from a province to elite provinces and elite provinces’ TFP (see Equation 3).
Elites are provinces that gained TFP values higher than the TFP value of 75th quartile.
The significant results in Column 1 in Table 9 indicate that spillovers from nearer elites
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Table 9: Baseline Estimation C
Provincial TFP 4TFPp,t (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Baseline Upper PCI Lower PCI Upper TFP Lower TFP Upper PCI Upper PCI Lower PCI Lower PCI
Upper TFP Lower TFP Upper TFP Lower TFP
Provincial governance 4PCIp, t 0.017+ 0.034* -0.008 0.038* 0.012+ 0.060* 0.016+ -0.006 0.008
quality (1.69) (2.34) (-0.48) (2.06) (1.72) (2.5) (1.65) (-0.22) (0.64)
Labour density 4LABp, t− 1 0.009+ 0.108 0.016* 0.009 -0.562 0.121 -0.321 0.027* -1.184
(1.87) (1.28) (2.2) (1.03) (-1.29) (0.92) (-1.18) (2.45) (-0.64)
FDI projects/number 4FDIp, t− 1 0.317+ 0.009 0.574* 0.396 0.143 -0.226 0.056 1.064+ 0.218
of firms (1.76) (0.04) (2.35) (0.97) (1.08) (-0.55) (0.41) (1.87) (0.99)
Number of students in 4STUp, t− 1 -0.023 -0.036 -0.024 -0.025 -0.018 0.121 -0.107+ -0.103 0.035
colleges/universities (-0.47) (-0.60) (-0.34) (-0.24) (-0.43) (0.78) (-1.85) (-0.57) (1.21)
Share in national 4MANUp, t− 1 0.302 0.397 0.19 0.199 0.277+ 0.882 0.36 -0.306 0.251
manufacturing output (0.93) (1.00) (0.49) (0.35) (1.74) (0.82) (1.16) (-0.57) (1.00)
Weighted distance to elite 4DISTp, t− 1 2.809* 1.908+ 4.333* 2.946+ 1.419 0.906 0.866 6.461** 1.847
provinces (2.54) (1.67) (1.96) (1.93) (1.32) (0.63) (0.58) (2.71) (1.38)
Year # Municipality Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster (Province) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 183 92 91 93 90 53 39 40 51
R-sq 0.193 0.263 0.265 0.251 0.064 0.389 0.33 0.429 0.13
Note: t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.1; ∗p < 0.05; ∗ ∗ p < 0.01; ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
Source: Author’s compilation using data drawn from the Vietnamese Enterprise Survey 2005-2010 and provincial
data downloaded from www.gso.gov.vn. The weighted average provincial TFP level is scaled down by being divided
by 106. Upper PCI are PCI which is higher than median value. Lower PCI are PCI which is lower than median
value. Upper productive provinces are those have TFP > median. Lower productive provinces are those have TFP
≤ median. The unweighted Provincial Competitiveness Index is downloaded from http://eng.pcivietnam.org.
are positive in the context of positive impacts from FDI spillovers, labour density, and
the improvement of local governance. The strongest technology diffusion from nearby elite
provinces are observed in provinces with lower PCI (Column 3, Table 9), more specifically,
in lower PCI but upper TFP provinces (Column 8, Table 9).
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7 Conclusion
The early phase (2000-2005) of the economic reforms in Vietnam saw the impressive imple-
mentation of “cutting the red tape”. This policy has reduced the administrative barriers
for enterprises to enter manufacturing industries. Stylized facts show that during this
phase, there were impressive increases in the number of manufacturers and in the growth
in the labour force working in the industries.
In the second phase (2006-2010), “cutting the red tape” continues to reduce docu-
ments required in business regulations. Furthermore, “one-stop shops” were established
to decentralize the central authorities control on business regulations to provincial au-
thorities. The centralization provides more convenient and efficient public administrative
services to enterprises as well as encourages better interaction between local authorities
and entrepreneurs.
In both phases, most TFP leading manufacturers (firms at the fourth quartile of TFP)
produced on average in a larger firm-size, and performed at a higher TFP growth rate.
Nevertheless, a higher leverage ratio or capital intensity were observed neither in TFP
frontier firms in all industries, nor in a specific phase of the economic reforms. It is worth
noting that the second phase of the reforms saw an increase in the participation of female
workers in the labour force of firms leading productivity in low-technology industries.
Interesting findings reveal that the TFP gap between the least productive and the frontier
firms was narrowed much more in the second phase of the reforms across industries and
economic regions. However, slower catch-up in TFP was still seen more in high-technology
industries than in low-technology industries in the second phase.
Interestingly, this paper does find evidence of the improvement in local governance
quality on provincial manufacturing TFP during the second phase of the reforms. Im-
portantly, lower productive provinces also observed the positive effects of the better local
governance on their TFP. In addition, the impacts of advanced local governance on provin-
cial manufacturing productivity are shown in the context of significant technology diffusion
from nearby leading TFP provinces.
The limitation of the study is that the investigation of the quality of local gover-
nance only focused in the ease of doing business. Taxation regulations and regulations
for international and regional practices in specific are not yet discussed. Further research
may be conducted to explore whether taxation control which is decentralized to the local
governments can stimulate productivity.
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A Appendix
A.1 List of selected industries
Industry VSIC1993
Food Products 15
Textiles 17
Wearing Apparel; Dressing & Dying of Fur 18
Tanning & Dressing of Leather 19
Products of Wood 20
Paper products 21
Publishing, Printing & Reproduction of Recorded Media 22
Chemical Products 24
Rubber & Plastic Products 25
Other Non-metallic Products 26
Basic Metals 27
Fabricated Metal Products 28
Machinery & Equipment, Office, Accounting & Computing Machinery 29 + 30
Electrical Machinery & Apparatus N.e.c; Television & Communication Equipment 31 + 32
Medical, Precision & Optical Instruments 33
Motor Vehicles, Trailers & Semi-trailers & Other Transport Equipment 34 +35
Furniture; Manufacturing N.e.c 36
Source: The 2-digit classification is VSIC 1993 provided by the General Statistics of Vietnam.
The Food industry includes 4-digit classification from 1511 - 1520.
A.2 Algorithm of Production Function Estimation by Instrumental Vari-
ables (Wooldridge (2009) and Petrin and Levinsohn (2012))
Following the theoretical framework documented by JW, I first setting up a production
function:38
vait = β0 + βllit + βkkit + ωit + it (5)
Where: vait is the log of value added, lit is the log of number of labours, kit is the log
of capital stocks. Similar to Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003),
Wooldridge (2009)separates the error terms into ωit which is the unobserved productivity
of firm, and it which is the measurement errors of the value added and the unpredictable
shocks. it is orthogonal on current and past inputs):
E[it|kit, lit,mit, ki,t−1, li,t−1,mi,t−1, ki1, li1,mi1] = 0; t = 1, 2...T (6)
The assumption in equation 6 can be strengthen by adding the serial independence of
it, i.e: it is random, is uncorrelated with its past values, and has zero mean.
Demand of intermediate inputs is: mit = m(ωit, kit). When mit strictly increases in
ωit, it allows for the inversion of m(.), yields: ωit = f(mit, kit).
39
38To be in line with Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method, I use the notation vait which is the log of
value added while Wooldridge (2009)states the dependent variable is the log of output in general.
39This is the assumption documented by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). When the method of Olley and
Pakes (1996) is applied, the investment is used instead of the intermediate inputs.
33
Because unobserved productivity ωit follows the Markov rule:
ωit = E[ωit|ωi,t−1] + ait = g[f(mi,t−1, ki,t−1)] + ait (7)
Orthogonal condition of ait is given by:
40
E[ait|kit, ki,t−1, li,t−1,mi,t−1] = 0 (8)
The shocks ait is uncorrelated with kit because capital stock is chosen at period t− 1.
The uncorrelation of ait with other variables in lagged values are obviously owing to the
timing of choices were made in the past.
In this light, Wooldridge (2009) sets up two simultaneous equations which jointly
estimate the coefficients of capital stocks and labour inputs:
vait = β0 + βllit + βkkit + f(kit,mit) + it (9)
vait = β0 + βllit + βkkit + g[f(ki,t−1,mi,t−1)] + ait + it (10)
Orthogonal condition for equation 9 is given in equation 6. Orthogonal condition for
equation 10 is:
E[(it + ait)|kit, lit,mit, ki,t−1, li,t−1,mi,t−1, ki1, li1,mi1] = 0 (11)
In these two equations 9 and 10, there are unknown forms of f(.) and g(.). Wooldridge
(2009) suggests the same method from Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and Olley and Pakes
(1996), where f(.) includes polynomials of the inputs up to third order. g(.) contains the
low-order polynomials in lag of ωit, which can be approximated by the polynomials of lag
of inputs in practice. Combined with the orthogonal condition from equation 11, sets of
instruments could be assigned for equation 9 and 10.
Zit1 = [1, kit, lit, f(kit,mit)] (12)
Zit2 = [1, kit, li,t−1, g[f(ki,t−1,mi,t−1)] (13)
Specifically, in Zit1, f(kit,mit) includes all polynomials of kit,mit up to the third order,
but does not include kit for the identification of kit in equation 9.
41
40ait is assumed to be orthogonal to kit and all past values of (kit, lit,mit).
41This is also similar to the first stage of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) or Olley and Pakes (1996).
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In Zit2, g(.) includes the (up to) third polynomials in lag of capital stocks and materials
and qi,t−1. qi,t−1 is defined as the low-order polynomials in the function of lags of kit,mit.
The second set of instruments does not include lit,mit. Wooldridge (2009) suggests Zit1
and Zit2 can also be applicable for equation 10.
Wooldridge (2009) notes that equation 10 could be estimated using instrument variable
(IV) when f [g(.)] is completely unspecified. The author also states that lags would be
added to test the overidentification restrictions but at the cost of loosing observations.
Petrin and Levinsohn (2012) practice the application of the exact identification in 10.
Simply, Petrin and Levinsohn (2012) instrument lit with its own lag, and other exogenous
variables shown in the orthogonal condidition in equation 11 act as their own instruments.
A.3 Linkage between Province’s Density and Provincial TFP
This section examines whether TFP were different across municipal and non-municipal
area. Five municipalities of Vietnam are Ha Noi Capital (Red River Delta region), Hai
Phong (Red River Delta region), Da Nang (South Central Coast region), Can Tho (Mekong
River Delta region), Ho Chi Minh city (Southeast region). Those cities play a key roles as
a regional center of economics, politics, geography, and culture. Therefore, they are the
biggest clusters of workers, experts, producers, and services suppliers in the country. Mar-
ket demand is higher, infrastructure is also more developed, technology is more advanced
in municipalities than other areas. Unsurprisingly, Figure 6 shows that the distributions
of ln(TFP) in municipalities shift more to the right in both sub-periods. In other words,
on average, technology efficiency of municipal areas were higher than non-municipal areas.
Denser areas (and more developed), such as municipal cities, filtered for higher produc-
tivity producers. The result is in line with findings of Syverson (2004) and Combes et al.
(2012). There might be several reasons explaining for the results. Specifically, (i) these
municipal provinces have advantages of natural resource and location as the linkages to
other provinces: (ii) historically, manufacturing clusters were shaped in those cities; (iii)
more urbanized areas generate higher agglomeration effects; (iv) tougher competition in-
duces the self-selection of firms and keep firms with high efficiency staying in the market
(see Syverson (2004) and Combes et al. (2012)).
In more details, higher productivity was also shown in relation with the density of
labour. Figure 7a plots the province’s density ratio (log value of number of citizens older
than 15 years-old per km2) against the ln value of weighted average TFP by province
(TFPpt) (method measuring provincial TFP is explained in Section 5.3).
Consistently, positive correlation between the density ratio province and the average
productivity are shown for 5 years (2006-2010).42 In other words, firms in more urbanized
cities on average gained more efficiency. The results are similar to the finding of TFP in
big cities in France by Combes et al. (2012). Nevertheless, in stead of using average TFP
as Combes et al. (2012), this paper calculates weighted average TFP which counts for the
42As we do not have data for labour density before 2005, we only draw the graph for the second sub-
period.
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Figure 6: Distribution of ln(TFP) across Municipal and non-municipal areas, 2001-2010
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Source: Author’s compilation using data drawn from the Vietnamese Enterprise Survey 2000–2010 for two sub-periods. Municipal
areas are Hanoi, Haiphong, Danang, Cantho, and Hochiminh city.
size of firm in term of their employment.
Interestingly, Figure 7a indicates that there are two outliers of the labour density ratio
(ratio > 2) which are Hanoi capital and Hochiminh city. However, log average TFP of
these outliers were similar as several medium density cities (density ratio ranged from 0
to 2), and also lagged behind some other medium density cities. The evidence of medium
density provinces with leading TFP was shown much clearer in Figure 7a.
Figure 7: Linkages between Provincial Weighted Average Productivity, Provincial Labour
Density, and Provincial Firm Density, 2006-2010
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Source: Author’s compilation using data drawn from the Vietnamese Enterprise Survey 2005-2010. Selected 2-digit VSIC 1993
industries are listed in the Appendix A.1. (a) Number of citizens (older than 15 year-old) by year and data of land area by
province are downloaded from www.gso.vn. (b)Density of firms is number of firms by province. High density areas had higher
number of firms than medium number of firm in the country. Low density ares had less number of firms than medium number of
firm. Variables are in log values.
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Additional, provinces with higher density of firms (number of manufacturers were
larger than the country’s medium number) observed higher TFP on average (Figure 7b).
More firms participated in the manufacturing in one province not only enhanced compet-
itiveness but also increased substitutes for suppliers. This resulted in stronger agglomer-
ation effects within the province (Syverson, 2004). Remarkably, in Figure 7b, the second
sub-period observed the up-wards shift and the less dispersion in TFP distribution of the
more advanced areas.
A.4 Robustness check
This part presents the results of the regression on current and future variables in stead of
lagged variables in the baseline specification. The regressions of robustness checks confirms
for the findings in the baseline results (Table 10).
Table 10: Results of Placebo Test
(a) 4TFPp,t (b) 4TFPp,t
Provincial governance 4PCIp,t+1 -0.011 Provincial governance 4PCIp,t+2 -0.010
quality (-1.17) quality (-0.92)
Labour density 4LABp,t -0.020+ Labour density 4LABp,t+1 0.004
(-1.91) (0.46)
FDI projects/number 4FDIp,t -0.179 FDI projects/number 4FDIp,t+1 -0.022
of firms (-1.41) of firms (-0.12)
Number of students in 4STUp,t 0.049 Number of students in 4STUp,t+1 0.016
colleges and universities (1.11) colleges and universities (0.54)
Share in national 4MANUp,t -0.325+ Share in national 4MANUp,t+1 0.169
manufacturing output (-1.81) manufacturing output (0.51)
Year # Municipality Yes Year # Municipality Yes
Cluster (Province) Yes Cluster (Province) Yes
N 182 N 122
R-sq 0.162 R-sq 0.017
Note: t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.1; ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001. Source: Author’s compilation using
data drawn from the Vietnamese Enterprise Survey 2005-2010 and provincial data downloaded from www.gso.gov.vn.
The Provincial Competitiveness Index are downloaded from http://eng.pcivietnam.org.
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